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VICTIMS' PARTICIPATION RIGHTS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW

MIRIAM COHEN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The formation of the International Criminal Court marked an important
change in international criminal justice. The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (hereinafter "Rome Statute")' not only established the
International Criminal Court (hereinafter the "ICC" or the "Court") as a permanent
institution with jurisdiction "over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern," 2 but also brought about changes to the international
criminal scene,3 namely a completely new system for victims' participation in
criminal proceedings 4 during the trial phase as well as the pre-trial phase.5 One of
the Court's main function is the establishment of the truth and in this sense
participation of victims may contribute to the accomplishment of this goal.6
The recognition of victims' participatory rights in criminal proceedings is a
novelty in international criminal law.7 Victims' right to participate in the
*LLB (Universit6 de Montr6al); LL.M. (Cantab). The research of the Court's jurisprudence is upto-date until September 2008. This article builds upon a research project pursued at the University of
Cambridge in 2007. I want to thank Dr. Roger O'Keefe and Jane Bestor for reading an earlier version
of this article and providing insightful comments. All errors of fact and interpretation are my own.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
37 I.L.M. 1002 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Id. art. 1.
3. In comparison to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals preceding the International
Criminal Court [hereinafter ICC or the Court] the differences are numerous. This study will focus on
the provisions relating to participatory rights.
4. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68. See also Carsten Stahn et al., Participationof Victims
in Pre-TrialProceedings of the ICC, 4 J. INT'L CRIM, JUST. 219 (2006) [hereinafter Stahn et al.;
Gerard J. Mekjian & Mathew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim's Voice: Analysis of Victims" Advocate
Participationin the Trial Proceedingof the InternationalCriminal Court, 17 PACE INT'L L. R. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Mekjian & Varughese]; Timothy Kuhner, The Status of Victims in the Enforcement of
International Criminal Law, 6 OR. REV, INT'L L. 95 (2004). See generally Gilbert Bitti & Hakan
Friman, Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 456 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).
5. In this study, the author will not differentiate between the trial and the pre-trial phase
pertaining to victims' participation in proceedings, but rather study the subject in a general approach.
6. David Donat-Cattin, Article 68 Protection of Victims and Witness and their Participationin
the Proceedings,in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1275, 1300 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
7. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 328 (3d
ed. 2007) [hereinafter SCHABAS]. See also Emily Haslam, Victim Participationat the International
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proceedings is one of the main innovative features of the Court, granting victims
further rights than testifying as witnesses. 8 Before the ICC, other international
criminal tribunals did not provide victims with significant rights of participation
and were mainly concerned with bringing criminals to justice.9 In this sense, this
participatory scheme is a distinguishing feature between the ICC and other ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, such as the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the
Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal

for Rwanda (hereinafter "ICTR") which bear no provisions on victims'
participation in proceedings.' 0 As far as national criminal law systems are
concerned, victims may have participatory rights to a certain degree depending on
the jurisdiction in question.ll
The adoption of provisions recognizing participatory rights has caused much
dissension amongst jurists. The arguments in favor and against victims'
participation in proceedings are numerous. 12 Many argue that the recognition of13
participatory rights represents a great victory in international criminal justice.
Others fear that victim participation in proceedings may conflict with15the accused's
right to a fair trial 14 and "affect the expeditiousness of proceedings."
Criminal Court: A Triumph ofHope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: LEGAL POLICY AND ISSUES 315 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Haslam].
See also Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, 167 (1999).
8. See Haslam, supra note 7, at 315. See also Silvia A. Fernindez de Gurmendi, Elaborationof
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 235, 255 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).

9. Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 4, at 15 (suggesting that in the ICTR victims were granted
some minimal participatory rights which consisted of the prosecutor asking the victims as well as
witnesses whether some individuals should be investigated for further crimes against humanity).
10. See generally Michael Bachrach, The Protection of Rights and Victims under International
Criminal Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 7 (2000) (providing a more detailed study on victims' rights under
international criminal law) [hereinafter Bachrach].See also David Donat-Cattin, The Role of Victims in
ICC Proceedings, in COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 251, 268 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999).
11. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 220 (discussing the fact that victims' participation rights
differ depending on national law system. The authors contend that the participatory scheme within the
ICC is aligned with some civil law systems that allow in general for victims' active participation in
criminal proceedings). This article does not analyze victims' participatory rights in national systems.
See generally MARION ELEONORA INGEBORG BRIENEN & ERNESTINE HENRIETTE HOEGEN, VICTIMS OF
CRIME IN 22 EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (2000) (discussing participatory rights in
domestic European systems).

12. This article will examine some of these arguments.
13. See Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity,
Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUMAN RTS L. R. 625, 643 (2001). See also Claude Jorda &
Jr6me de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1388 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002)

[hereinafter Jorda & de Hemptinne].
14. See Mugambi Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the
InternationalCriminal Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 249, 278 (2007).
15. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, Decision of the Appeals
Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the
"Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007,
12 (June 13, 2007)
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It has been asserted that "punishing the criminals is not enough" as there will
be no justice without ensuring justice for victims. 16 Moreover, it has been argued

that allowing victims to participate in proceedings may preclude them from "taking
justice in their own hands" and stop the cycle of violence. 17 Taking part in
proceedings only as witnesses before the ICC does not address victims' concerns;
as witnesses they are an object in the criminal process. 18 Victims have witnessed
the crimes but also live with the consequences of those crimes; therefore their
position and rights as victims go beyond that of a witness.
The adoption of provisions that allow victims to participate in proceedings
regarding hideous crimes can also represent an achievement in bringing criminals
to justice. Victims can provide the Court with knowledge that only those who
experienced these crimes can give and "their attendance in person at the trial may
help in establishing the truth." 19 As Claude Jorda and J6r6me de Hemptinne have
observed, the ICC "appears to mark a new step forward .... victims are accorded
the double status denied to them by the provisions setting up the ad hoc
Tribunals., 20 Their participation will ensure that their concerns are taken into
account when passing a final judgement on criminals. Nevertheless, victims'
participation rights are provided for throughout the proceedings and not only
during the trial stage. 21 After all, crimes were committed not just against the
international community but also against people, namely the victims.
As the right to take part in proceedings has been recognized in the Rome
Statute, it remains for the different Chambers of the Court to interpret the scope of
participatory rights. The jurisprudence concerning the scope and interpretation of
participatory rights are currently under development. In order to provide for
effective participation, the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence 22 combined establish victims' participation rights. These provisions,
although providing for the same objective of giving victims a voice in proceedings,
23
differ in application. On the one hand, articles 15(3) and 19 of the Rome Statute
for example recognize very specific rights of participation that apply only in the
context prescribed in the text of these provisions. On the other hand, victims are
granted a very broad right of participation because article 68(3) recognizes

[hereinafter The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims].
16. Fiona McKay, The Victims Rights Working Group, The Conference for the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Speech on Behalf of the Victims Rights Working Group (June 16,
at
available
1998)
http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/01/1 998%2ORome%20Statement%2016%2OJuneI .pdf
17. Sam Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues, 3 INT'L
CRIM. L. R. 345, 349-50 (2003).
18. See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 328. In the ICTY and ICTR the roles of victims were merely
to provide testimonies as witnesses to the parties. Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1391.
19. Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1388.
20. Id.
21. Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 237.
22. U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court [PCNICC], Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 1 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter RPE ICC].
23. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, paras. 3, 19.
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participatory rights in the "proceedings," making it possible for victims to
participate in different phases of the proceedings. 24
The extent to which victims can take part in proceedings, as well as the
conditions of participation regarding this general right of participation affirmed in
article 68(3) will have an impact in the exercise of other specific participatory
rights in the proceedings. Accordingly, what is the difference between a situation
and a case and what is the status of victims relating to each? 25 Is the investigation
phase included in the term "proceedings" of article 68(3)? Finally, what are the
criteria for eligibility as victims and more specifically what is the conception of
"personal interests", which determines the status of victim to a situation or a case.
These questions will be addressed in this article that analyses the compatibility of
participatory rights with the rights of the accused.
Victims' participation may not amount to a second prosecutor2 6 since it would
be against the rights of the accused and contrary to a fair trial (which are in turn
conditions to participation pursuant to article 68(3)).27 The Rome Statute grants
diverse participatory rights but is not clear as to how these rights may be applied in
practice and how conflicting interests might be reconciled. Much is left for
judicial interpretation and clarification. The jurisprudence of the Court in this
regard is still being developed thus it is not yet entirely clear what role victims
might play in the different stages of criminal proceedings and how far their rights
can go. 28 From the few decisions of the different Chambers of the Court, it29 can be
argued that a common interpretation of participatory rights is being sought.
The goal of this paper is to give a critical overview of the participatory
scheme devised within the ICC. It analyzes the scope of victims' participation at
different stages in the proceedings and the interpretation of participatory rights
thus far. It also focuses on examining some specific provisions and the application
of article 68(3) at different stages of the proceedings. Although article 68(3) is
contained in Part 6 of the Rome Statute concerning "the trial", as this paper will
24. Id. art. 68, para. 3.
25. See, e.g., Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 221-23 (concerning the difference between victims of a
situation and victims of a case).
26. See The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15, 28.
See also id. f 19 (Pikis, J., concurring) (stating that the "e]quality of arms is another element of a fair
trial, which in the context of the Statute, putting the burden of proof on the Prosecutor, means that the
defendant cannot be required to confront more than one accuser. Holding the scales even between the
parties with the burden of proof cast upon the Prosecutor rules out a second accuser.") [hereinafter
Separate Opinion ofJudge Pikis].
27. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68, para. 3.
28. See Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1388-89. See also Julian Fernandez, Variation
sur la victime et la justice p~nale internationale, REVUE DE CIVILISATION CONTEMPORAINE DE
L'UNIVERSITt DE BRETAGNE OCCIDENTALE 1, 9 (2006) (Fr.) (stating that "Le r6gime de ]a CPI d6pend
encore de sa digestion future par les d6cisions de la Cour
") available at www.univbrest. fr/amnis/documents/Femandez2006.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Situation in Uganda, Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on
Victims' Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and
a/01 11/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-103 (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Prosecution'sApplication for
Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision].
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examine, it has been used in relation to participation at other stages of the
proceedings. This paper will also analyze whether equilibrium can be reached in
practice between opposing interests of the Prosecution, the accused, and victims.
The analysis in this paper of the different participatory provisions follows the
structure of the Rome Statute. It will first focus on certain provisions concerning
specific participatory rights -- that allow participation only within the scope of the
specific provision and the application of the criteria in article 68(3) to these
provisions. Then, it will examine the conditions for the exercise of the broad right
of participation pursuant to article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. Finally, the paper
will conclude by contending that a balance between contrasting interests can be
reached in practice.
II. THE ROAD TO THE ADOPTION OF PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE ROLE OF VICTIMS IN THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
This section will focus briefly on victims' rights within the framework of ad
hoc international criminal tribunals in order to illustrate the position of victims in
international criminal proceedings prior to the ICC. This section does not intend to
give a thorough analysis of the practice and jurisprudence of these tribunals. The
aim of this section is to point out the gap that existed prior to the establishment of
the ICC in matters relating to participatory rights in order to set the context to
examine the groundbreaking system of victims' participation created in the ICC.
Although victims are an inevitable part of an armed conflict, their rights have
not been recognized in a satisfactory way in criminal proceedings prior to the
establishment of the ICC. Neither in the World War II trials nor in the ad hoc
tribunals which followed, were victims allowed to participate. 30 The Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials represented a step forward in international criminal justice by
creating a new era for the recognition of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide regarding individuals' accountability for their actions in the international
arena. 31 This beginning of the fight against impunity was crucial for the
development of international criminal law as it is today. Just like any new system,
however, it needed improvements. One of the changes that needed to be made was
in relation to the rights of victims.
After the Second World War tribunals, other conflicts started that generated
new international criminal tribunals. This was the case for the ICTR and the
ICTY. In spite of the great achievements of the ICTY and ICTR in bringing war
criminals to justice and promoting peace in their respective regions, they failed to
address victims' concerns.32 As stated above,33 the ICTY Statute did not include
30. See generally Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 4, at 7-15.
3 1. Id. See generally Luc Walleyn, Victimes et tkmoins de crimes internationaux:du droit 6 une
protection au droit d la parole, 84 Revue internationalede la Croix-Rouge 51 (2002). In this article,
the author analyzes, inter alia, the rights granted to victims prior to the ICC in international
humanitarian law.
32. See generally Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 13. In relation to the ICTY, see generally
Marie-Bnfdicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, Victim-witnesses at War Crimes Trials: Silencing
Hearings? 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151 (2004). For a study of victims' rights before the United Nations ad
hoc criminal tribunals, see Haslam, supra note 7, at 317-19.
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provisions that recognized participatory rights.34 The ICTR Statute also did not

provide for such rights, but, according to Gerard Mekjian and Mathew Varughese,
the ICTR did establish some minor participatory rights in very specific
circumstances.35 In these tribunals, generally the role that victims play is solely
that of a witness. This position is consistent with the view that criminal
proceedings are between the Prosecution and the defence. One possible reason for
the absence of participatory rights is that, contrary to the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals
were created by the adoption of Security Council resolutions. Only fifteen
member States of the United Nations are members of the Security Council (of
which, only five are permanent members).3 6 Therefore, the creation of these
tribunals and the adoption of their regulating statutes did not amount to a
representative system where all member states could negotiate the provisions, as
was the case for the ICC. This may be one of the underlying reasons that victims'
participatory rights were not a concern in the creation of these tribunals and the
adoption of their statutes.37
Acting as a witness can be one of the roles of victims, but not its main
attribution. Before serving as witnesses of crimes, they suffered the atrocities that
took place during conflicts and have to live with the consequences of crimes. As
Elizabeth Guigou has affirmed
Victims are not simply witnesses whose participation in proceedings
should be limited to gathering the information which they are able to
provide. They have a separate role to play, and this must be recognised
by the International Criminal 38Court, as is expressly provided for,
moreover, by the Rome Statute.

Even before the establishment of the ICTY there was pressure from the
international community for the creation of a permanent international criminal
institution with jurisdiction to judge international crimes such as war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. 39 Negotiations amongst States were taking
33. Supra note 3.
34. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). This is the Security Council
resolution that established the ICTY.
35. See Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 4, at 11-15.
36. The U.N. Security Council is composed of five permanent members: China, France, Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States and ten non-permanent members (with year of
term's end): Austria (2010), Japan (2010), Uganda (2010), Burkina Faso (2009), Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya (2009), Viet Nam (2009), Costa Rica (2009), Mexico (2010), Croatia (2009), Turkey
(2010). The General Assembly elected Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and Uganda to serve as nonpermanent members of the Security Council for two-year terms starting on January 1, 2009. The newly
elected countries will replace Belgium, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, and South Africa.
Current
membership information availableat http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
37. Other reasons have been suggested for explaining the lack of provisions concerning victims'
rights. See Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1391.
38. tlisabeth Guigou, Address of the Ministry of Justice at the International Colloquium on
"L'Acc~s des victims a la Cour Pdnale Internationale", (Apr. 27, 1999), cited in Jorda & de
Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1397.
39. See generally WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE (2006).
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place and soon after the establishment of the ICTY, the International Law
Commission (hereinafter "ILC") concluded a draft of the ICC Statute.4 °
The establishment of the ICC changed the situation of victims and their role
in international criminal proceedings in various ways. To sum up, it completely
modified the position of victims from witnesses of crimes to that of being the
subject of rights by granting them specific participatory rights at many stages of
the proceedings and a broad right of participation pursuant to article 68(3). In spite
of other important rights for victims, this paper will only focus on the participatory
rights scheme.
III.

SPECIFIC PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS IN PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FRAMEWORK

Before analyzing the provisions that grant victims participatory rights, it is
important to address the question of whether the recognition of victims' rights in
the Rome Statute is a good initiative in international criminal law. The recognition
of a role for victims in proceedings is an achievement that was, amongst other
factors, highly influenced by the "advocacy of non-governmental organisations, 'Al
which helped ensure that the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
contained strong provisions on victims' rights.42 The question that remains is how
these rights will be interpreted and applied in practice. In other words, how the
rights of victims will affect the rights of the accused and the duties of the
Prosecution, trial management and to what extent victims can take part in
proceedings. In light of these considerations, this paper will analyze the main
provisions that deal with participatory rights.43
As stated above,"4 victims are granted, throughout the Rome Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, various opportunities to participate in the ICC
The Rome Statute recognizes on many occasions different
proceedings.
participatory rights of victims. 46 It is imperative to analyze them, discuss their
differences, and determine in which cases they are applicable in order to
understand the ICC victims' participatory scheme. Moreover, it is important to
note, from the beginning of this study, that these rights differ greatly from each

40. Report of the International Law Commission on its forty-sixth session, May 2-July 22, 1994,
42-91, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
G.A. Res. 10,
41. Haslam, supra note 7, at 321.
42. Id. See also, Amnesty Int'l, The InternationalCriminal Court: Ensuring an effective role for
at
1999,
available
July
1,
40/10/1999,
Index:
IOR
Al
victims,
See also, Jorda
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400101999?open&of=ENG-385.
& de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1400. See also, Amnesty Int'l, The InternationalCriminal Court:
Part If, Al Index: IOR 40/011/1997, July 1, 1997, available at
Making the Right Choices
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/0 11/1997.
43. This paper will focus on selected provisions contained within the Rome Statute only.
44. Stahn et a]., supra note 4, at 224-37.
45. See generally Bachrach, supra note 10.
46. In this article, the author will focus on participation rights and will not analyze other rights
granted to victims within the ICC framework. For a complete study of victims' rights in the ICC
Statute, see Sam Garkawe, The Victim-Related Provisions of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A VictimologicalAnalysis 8 Int'l R. of Victimology 269 (2001).
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other,47 mainly in two ways: the stages at which victims can participate and who
can actually participate at each stage.48 In this section, this paper will examine
some participatory rights acknowledged throughout the Rome Statute that provide
for participation at different stages of the proceedings, 49 which the writer refers to
as "specific participatory rights" because their application is limited to situations
envisaged within the framework of the articles. This section will first examine
article 15(3) of the Rome Statute in the context of the decision of the Prosecution
to pursue an investigation. Second, this section will focus on article 19 of the
Rome Statute. Finally, this section will analyze articles 53 and 61 of the Rome
Statute as well as participation pursuant to articles 56 and 57 of the Rome Statute.
A. ParticipationUnder Part2 of the Rome Statute
The second Part of the Rome Statute concerns jurisdiction, admissibility and
applicable law. It contains important provisions on victims' participation rights in
the pre-trial phase of proceedings. In this context, this section will focus on article
15(3) and article 19 of Part 2 specifically.
1. Decision to Initiate Investigations (Article 15)
Article 15 deals with an important part of prosecutorial proceedings, the
decision to initiate investigations. It concerns the power attributed to the
Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information
received. 0 In many cases the information that leads the Prosecutor to start an
investigation propriomotu is provided by victims. 51 It may be argued that victims'
participation at this stage of proceedings is important in gathering all the relevant
information and understanding what in fact occurred during armed conflicts in
order to successfully start and pursue the investigation. For this reason, the Rome
Statute allows victims "to make representations" once the Prosecutor decides that
there are sufficient grounds to proceed with the investigation.52 The scope of their
participation is limited to "making representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber" and
is concerned only with the request to the Pre-Trial Chamber to start an
investigation. However restricted this right may be it is a very important one, since
it allows victims to participate at a very early stage of the proceedings, even before
the beginning of an investigation, the starting point of criminal proceedings. In
this sense, it is not premature at this early stage of proceedings to grant victims
rights to participate since the information provided may assist the Pre-Trial
Chamber in its decision on whether an investigation should start.

47. The author has divided participatory rights in two groups, specific rights and broad
participatory rights. In this section, the focus will be on some provisions that establish specific rights
of participation.
48. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 224-37.
49. This analysis of provisions concerning participatory rights is not exhaustive.
50. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, para. 1.
51. Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejic, Article 15, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 581, 590 (Otto Triffterer

ed., 2d ed. 2008).
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, para. 3.
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According to the text of article 15 of the Rome Statute, participation is only
permitted on the condition that its exercise is "inaccordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence" 3 Nevertheless, it is not clear from the text of article
15(3) whether their participation is also submitted to the conditions included in the
general participation scheme of article 68(3). This provision states that victims can
participate only "where their interests are affected" and the application of article
68(3) relates to "stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the
Court., 54 If one considers the request for authorization of an investigation to be a
stage of the proceedings as pursuant to article 68(3), then whether personal
interests are affected becomes a condition to the exercise of victims' participatory
rights under article 15(3).
The Decision on victims' applications for participation in the Uganda
Situation (hereinafter "the Single Judge Decision") is a landmark decision of the
ICC concerning victims' participatory rights. 55 It provided a thorough study of
previous decisions of the Court and analyzed various applications for participation
pursuant to article 68(3). This decision concerned the application of victims to
participate in the pre-trial phase of proceedings in the Uganda situation.
In this decision, the Single Judge has adopted a view that victims' "personal
interests" have an impact on the application of participatory rights pursuant to
article 15(3). In other words, the Single Judge Decision applied the principle
enacted in article 68(3) as a further condition to article 15(3). In fact, the Single
Judge Decision concluded that
Article 15, paragraph 3, provides that "victims" may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber when the Prosecutor concludes
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation and,
accordingly, submits to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for
authorisation of such an investigation in the absence of referral by a
State or the Security Council. In this scenario, the "personal interests"
of the alleged victim (or victims) may be affected since victims'
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber can provide factual and legal
elements for the decision to authorise the investigation into the situation
within which the same victims claim to have suffered harm as a result of
56
the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.

A final remark is crucial. Article 15(3) requires the making of representations
to be in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It is Rule 5017 that
53. Article 15(3) provides that "If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for
authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected. Victims may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence". Id.
54. Id. art. 68, para. 3. This provision will be studied in detail in Part IV of this paper.
55. Situation in Uganda, Decision on victims' applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06
to a/0070/0 6 , a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-101 (Aug. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter the Single Judge Decision].
56. Id. 90.

57. On a more practical basis, Rule 50(3) and Rule 50(4) concern the manner in which the
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applies to article 15(3). Rule 50(1) states that whenever the Prosecutor decides to
start an investigation, he or she must inform victims of this decision or inform the
Victims and Witness Unit. 58 It is important to stress the rather obvious fact that the
Prosecutor must inform only the victims of whom he is aware. The notification of
victims is an important step since it enables them to make representations as to
whether an investigation should take place and provide indications, which might
help the conduct of the investigation before it begins. 59 As it has been stated,6 ° the
Prosecution's obligation to inform victims of the intention to start investigations is
61
quite innovative in comparison with the duty of notification in national systems,
where the Prosecutor does not always have such an obligation at early stages of the
proceedings.62
2. Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Court or Admissibility of a Case

(Article 19)
Article 19(3) in Part 2 of the Rome Statute concerns a crucial issue in ICC
proceedings, namely "challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the
admissibility of a case." Article 19(3) reads as follows:
The Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question
of jurisdiction or admissibility. In proceedings with respect to
jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have referred the situation under
article 13, as well as victims, may also submit observations to the
63

Court.

participation occurs.
As stated in article 15(3), victims may only participate by "making
representations," which is explained in rule 50(3) that these must be "in writing'" to the Pre-Trial
Chamber. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, para. 3. RPE ICC , supra note 22, Rule 50,
3-4.
However, in the event that the Pre-Trial Chamber decides that it is appropriate it may "hold a hearing"
to gather further information or to ask further questions.
58. RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 50, 1.
59. As noted by Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 226 n. 32, the notification of victims at such an early
stage was a recommendation of the Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (85)11 on the
Position of the Victim in the Framework of CriminalLaw and Procedure,387th Mtg. of the Ministers'
Deputies, Doc. No. 2269 (1985).
60. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 227-28.
61. For an overview of the duty of notification in national systems, see id., at 227-28, where the
author states that: "France, Greece, Italy, Scotland, Turkey, Italy and Malta, do not formally obligate
the police or other criminal justice authorities to notify victims at this early stage. In Austria, Iceland
and Portugal, a partial statutory obligation for informing victims has been created, meaning that only
certain victims are notified, or only certain information is provided. In Germany and Sweden,
legislation recognizes that the victim should be notified at this stage, but does not place an obligation on
any party to carry out the task of notification. And while England, Wales, Ireland and the Netherlands
impose a duty on police to notify victims at the stage of the initiation of investigations, the duty in each
case is a general, non-statutory duty."
62. See THE REDRESS TRUST, ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS BEFORE THE
COURT: COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING LEGAL

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

REPRESENTATION FOR VICTIMS 4 (2005), availableat http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/02/
REDRESS%20-%2OLegal%20Representation%20for/o20Victims%2023%20May%/o202005.pdf
(concerning the interest of victims to participate at early stages of the proceedings).
63. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19, para. 3.
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This provision enacts a right of participation parallel to the duty of the
Prosecution with regard to the question of admissibility and jurisdiction. Since
victims have an interest that crimes of which they suffered the consequences are
admissible under the jurisdiction of the Court, it is fair that they may "submit
observations."
Here, the scope of the participation is different from that
recognized in article 15(3), as the right to make observations pursuant to article 19
is not only recognized for victims but also for those who have referred the situation
under article 13. Rule 59 applies to the proceedings pursuant to article 19.
Rule 59 provides for a very specific application of the right as it only allows
"the victims who have already communicated with the Court in relation to the case,
or their legal representatives" to submit observations.64 There are two important
points in this Rule. First, it concerns a limited category of victims - those who have
previously communicated with the Court - which means that there is an additional
practical condition for participation. The sense of "having communicated with the
Court" has been explained as "victims that, whilst not having (as yet) been allowed
to participate in proceedings, have nevertheless been in contact with the Court. 6 5
As concluded in the Single Judge Decision, "having communicated with the
Court" applies to victims who have presented the relevant form and duly registered
it with the Registry.66 Second, and more importantly, Rule 59 refers to "a case" as
opposed to "a situation. 67 In general terms, participation in a case is more
restricted than participation in a situation.68
This differentiation between "a situation" and "a case" becomes particularly
interesting if analyzed in the context of Rule 93, which concerns the power of the
Pre-Trial Chamber to seek the views of "victims of a situation., 69 Using a broad
interpretation and applying Rule 93 to the context described in article 19, the PreTrial Chamber might allow victims to submit their observations in relation to a
situation as well as a case. Be that as it may, this article submits that participation
should be limited to victims of a case because the participatory right provided for
in article 19 concerns very specific circumstances. Moreover, Rule 59 makes it
clear that participation is in relation to a case.
B. ParticipationPursuantto Part5 of the Rome Statute: Investigation and
Prosecution
A different regime from that established in Part 2 of the Rome Statute is
recognized for proceedings in Part 5, which concerns the "Investigation and
Prosecution., 70 These proceedings are also governed by the Rules of Procedure

64. RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 59, 1.
65. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 93.
66. Id.
67. For a difference between participation in a situation as opposed to a case, see Single Judge
11-21, 96-111.
Decision, supra note 55,
68. See Christopher K. Hall, Article 19, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 637, 640 (Otto Triffierer
ed., 2d ed. 2008).
69. Id.
70. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts, 53-61.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:3

and Evidence,7 ' which set the path for participation referring to the "initiation of
investigation" or the decision not to prosecute 72 and in relation to the confirmation
of charges, pursuant to article 6171 of the Rome Statute. Although the text of
article 53 does not specifically concern victims' right of participation,74 it is Rule
92(2) that makes the connection providing that the Court has a duty to notify to
victims of the Prosecutor's decision not to initiate investigations or not to
prosecute pursuant to article 53.75 Rule 92(2) limits the category of victims to
those who have already participated and "those who76have communicated with the
Court in respect of the situation or case in question."
The same category of victims is granted a right to participate in the
proceedings relating to the Court's decision to hold a hearing to confirm the
charges, pursuant to article 61 of the Rome Statute.77 It is Rule 92(3) that
establishes the duty of the Court to notify victims "who have communicated with
the Court in respect of the case in question" of its decision to hold a hearing to
confirm the charges.78
Another instance where victims' participatory rights become important is
where evidence is concerned.79 More specifically, article 56 of the Rome Statute
concerns a "unique investigative opportunity" which may be initiated by a request
of the Prosecutor or by the Pre-Trial Chamber itself.80 Article 57 concerns inter
alia the preservation of evidence. 81 Victims' participatory rights are important at
this stage because the preservation of evidence is a crucial point in the proceedings
and imperative for the Prosecution in the accomplishment of its duties, therefore
participation might affect the conduct of proceedings and trial-management.
Within these provisions, participatory rights are not specifically provided for in the
text of these articles. 82 Therefore, participatory rights can only be attached to
articles 56 and 57 by the application of article 68(3).
These provisions had an importance especially in regards to the Prosecution's
Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims' Applications for
Participation (hereinafter "Application for leave to appeal the Single Judge
Decision").83 The Single Judge Decision makes the connection between the
preservation of evidence as provided by articles 56 and 57 and the notion of
"personal interests," pursuant to article 68(3),84 making it clear that victims'

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 225.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art, 53.
Id.art. 61.
art.
53.
See generally id.
RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 92, 2.
Id.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art, 61.
RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 92, 3.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 56-57.
art. 56.
Id.
Id.art. 57.
See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1,arts. 56-57.
Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29.
Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, f 100.
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personal interests must be affected in order for them to be granted participatory
rights in proceedings relating to the preservation of evidence. Furthermore, in
relation to article 57 of the Rome Statute, the Single Judge Decision refers to the
presentation of victims' "views and concerns" as pursuant to article 68(3) of the
Rome Statute.8 5 In its Application for leave to appeal the Single Judge Decision,
the Prosecutor challenges the Single Judge Decision in relation to victims' rights to
participate at the investigation phase of proceedings. 86 In this regard, the
Prosecutor submits
that, on the one hand, the Decision includes extensive participation at
the investigative stage, including in activities undertaken pursuant to
leaves open the possibility
Articles 56 and 57 of the Statute, and further
87
participation.
undefined)
(and
further
of
The above-mentioned debate clarifies, pursuant to the Single Judge Decision,
that the conditions set out in article 68(3) of the Rome Statute are applicable to
other stages of the proceedings such as the investigation stage pursuant to articles
56 and 57 of the Rome Statute,8 8 even where the latter provisions do not expressly
establish a right to participate in proceedings. The Prosecution's response to the
Single Judge Decision's interpretation of participatory rights submits that the
participation of victims in the investigative phase of proceedings may compromise
the expeditiousness of the trial. 89 Furthermore, the Prosecution submits that "such
activity can impact the Prosecution's investigations, and thus affects fairness in
terms of "respect for the procedural rights of the Prosecutor"."9 In spite of the
Prosecution's arguments for clarification of the scope of victims' participation in
the investigation phase, 91 the Single Judge Decision has maintained the position to
allow victims to participate, pursuant to articles 56, 57 and 68(3) of the Rome
Statute. 92
85. Id. 101.
86. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 7.
87. Id.
88. Donat-Cattin, supra note 6, at 1286-87.
89. In fact the object of the Prosecution's application for Leave to Appeal is to clarify the extent
of victims' rights to participate in the investigative phase pursuant to article 68(3) and in relation to
articles 56 and 57. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra
note 29, 7.
90. Id. 13.
91. The prosecution submits further that in certain areas, such as in Northern Uganda for example,
the participation of victims in the investigation phase could have an impact in the outcome of the
investigation since external actors' pressure can compromise the fairness of the investigation.
Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 14.
92. Decision on the Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims'
Applications for Participation a/00 10/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0 111/06
to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-112 (Dec. 19, 2007) (hereinafter Decision on Prosecution's Application for
Leave to Appeal]. In this decision, the Single Judge denies the Prosecution's application for leave to
appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 26. In fact, the Prosecution's application for leave to
appeal concerned mainly the "issue of to what extent and in what manner victims may participate in an
investigation, under Article 68(3), including in relation to Articles 56 and 57(3)(c), which [he] submits
affects the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings." Prosecution's Application for Leave to
Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 7.
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The Single Judge Decision reiterated in December 2007, in the Decision on
the Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims'
Applications for Participation93 that victims have a right to participate in the
investigative phase of proceedings, only by presenting their "views and concerns,"
94
which he classifies as not an "active" intervention.
It is not clear from the text of article 68(3) that it is applicable in this context
and articles 56 and 57, which concern the investigation stage, do not expressly
provide for victims' participatory rights. Considering the impact of evidence
management in the investigation stage and in the entirety of proceedings, profound
attention should be given to this phase as it regards victims' participation. In order
to maintain a balance between victim's and accused's rights, in certain stages
participation may not be appropriate.
IV. A GENERAL PARTICIPATORY RIGHT: PARTICIPATION
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 68(3) OF THE ROME STATUTE

IN THE PROCEEDINGS

Article 68(3) concerns the participation of victims in the proceedings without
any attachment to a specific stage of the proceedings. The text of the provision
reads as follows:
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall
permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at
stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and
in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused and fair and impartial trial. 95
The Court has not made a general conclusion as to the scope of article 68(3),
limiting itself to the application of this article on a case-by-case basis and to certain
phases of the proceedings. 96 In other words, this provision is contained in Part 6 of
the Rome Statute, which pertains to "the trial", but the text of the provision does
not limit it to the trial phase.97 In fact, this provision states that when victims'
personal interests are affected, "the Court shall permit their views and concerns to
be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be
appropriateby the Court" (emphasis added).98
On the one hand, the text of article 68(3) does not specify that participation is
only permitted in the trial phase. On the other hand, the structure of the Rome

93. Decision on Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 92.
94. Id. 31.
95. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 68, para. 3.
96. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 236 (arguing that there are two different approaches to the
interpretation of this article: "One might argue that the Pre-Trial Chamber is empowered to permit the
views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at any stage of the proceedings, pursuant
to Article 68(3) . . . Article 68(3) might be viewed as a general mandate clause, which needs to be
implemented through other specific provisions in the Statute and Rules and does therefore not serve as
an independent basis of authority for the Court to allow for broader victims' involvement.").
97. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at part VI.
98. Id. at art. 68, para. 3.
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Statute suggests that the provisions contained in Part 6 refer solely to the trial stage
thus the location of article 68(3) in this Part could indicate that it is limited to the
trial phase. If the first interpretation is adopted, article 68(3) was misplaced and
should not have been included in that part of the Rome Statute, which concerns the
trial stage specifically. Those in favor of this approach99 rely on the fact that the
text of the provision mentions at "stages of the proceedings determined by the
Court" which is not limited only to the trial stage otherwise it would only indicate
"at the trial stage." However, in accordance with article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter "VCLT'), 1 0 which is the
instrument for interpreting treaties such as the Rome Statute, the location of the
provision in Part 6 is an important element for the interpretation, indicating an
element of context. If article 31 (1)of the VCLT 101 is used to interpret article 68(3)
of the Rome Statute, it could be concluded that the latter only concerns the trial
stage.
This paper favors the first interpretation for two reasons. First, albeit the title
of Part 6 concerns the trial phase, the text of the article provides two literal
indications that its application is not limited to the trial phase. The first indication
is the word "stage" in the plural, implying that it refers to various stages. If it
referred solely to the "trial stage" it would have been specified that their views
were to "be presented and considered at the trial stage" (or at least the word
"stage" would be in the singular, referring only to the "trial stage"). Second, the
use of the word "proceedings" is larger than the trial alone and includes not only
the trial phase but also the pre-trial phase.
With this caveat, this paper submits that article 68(3) does not create an
unlimited right of participation at any or all stages of the proceedings. The
conditions stipulated in this provision play a major role in deciding whether
victims should participate in a specific phase but in spite of the broad scope of
article 68(3) there are stages of proceedings when it is inappropriate for victims to
participate, as for example participation pursuant to articles 56 and 57.
Furthermore, the Court's role is crucial in limiting the application of article 68(3)
only to stages of proceedings that are appropriate and not using this provision
indiscriminately to allow victims to take part at every phase of the proceedings. In
light of these considerations, a thorough analysis of the conditions of article 68(3)
is imperative. This will be the object of the next section, which first studies the
conditions that triggers the existence of a participatory right and second the scope
of the participation.

99. See Jrr6me de Hemptinne, The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International
Criminal Court: An Option Worth Pursuing?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 408, 412 (2007) (concluding that
article 68(3) of the Rome Statute provides for a participatory right at "'all phases of the proceedings,
from the opening of the investigation until the sentencing.").
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311.
101. Id.
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A. The Conditionsfor the Exercise ofParticipatoryRights Containedin Article

68(3)
1. Definition of Victims Within the ICC Framework
The right to participate in proceedings is not automatic. 10 2 The first condition
for participation is very clearly stated in the text of the article: the participant must
qualify as a victim. 10 3 The Rome Statute does not define the term "victim", which
is given in Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC. Therefore,
the first consideration when examining participatory rights is the concept of victim.
According to Rule 85:
For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence:
(a) "victims" means natural persons who have suffered harm as a
result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of

the court;
(b) victims may include organizations or institutions that have

sustained direct harm to any of their property

....

104

The term "victims" is quite vague and it includes not only natural persons but
also organizations and institutions (which in practice translate as a greater category
of victims who can take part in the proceedings).105 The scope of the definition of
victims, it has been argued, might interfere with the fairness and expeditiousness of
the trial since "the definition is too broad and vague allowing for too many victims
to participate." 1 6 Thus a precise analysis of victims' applications for participation
7
is crucial.'

0

102. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-925, Decision of the Appeals
Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the
"Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007,
12 (June 13, 2007)
(concluding that a right to participate in an appeal is not automatic and a demonstration that the
personal interests are affected is always necessary). See also, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
ICC-01/04-01/06-824, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Dcision sur la demande de mise en libert6 provisoire de Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo", 43 (Feb. 13 2007) [hereinafter Judgment on theA appeal of Lubanga Dyilo ("In the
absence of any express mention of victims within regulations 64 (4) or (5), the Appeals Chamber
therefore does not interpret the reference to a "participant" or to the filing of "[tihe response" within
those provisions to mean that victims have an automatic right to participate in an interlocutory appeal
under article 82 (1) (b) of the Statute").
103. See Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 9 (implying that the concept of victim should
follow the definition given in Rule 85 RPE ICC).
104. RPE ICC, supra note 22, at Rule 85.
105. Compare RPE ICC, supra note 22, at Rule 85 with Int'l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Rules of Procedureand Evidence, 2(a), IT/32/Rev. 37 (Apr. 6, 2006) (providing for a more restricted
definition of victim, "Victim: A person against whom a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction
has allegedly been committed").
106. Requite de la D~fense sollicitantl'autorisationd'interjeterappel de la < Decision on Victims'
Participation >) rendue le 18janvier 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1135, 28-32 (Jan. 28, 2008).
107. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1136, Application for Leave
to Appeal Trial Chamber I's 18 January 2008 Decision on Victims' Participation, Introduction (Jan. 28,
2008).
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This issue has been studied in a decision of the Trial Chamber in the case of
The Prosecutorv. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.108 The Trial Chamber in this decision
has taken a very broad approach in granting victim status to persons having
suffered harm, allowing an applicant who "suffered any harm as a result of the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court" to participate in
proceedings. 10 9 This conclusion is controversial and was the object of an
application for leave to appeal by both the Defence and Prosecution, which was
indeed granted.'1 10
The Appeals Chamber rendered a decision on July 11, 2008.111 The Appeals
Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's decision11 2 on the extent to which Rule 85
has the effect of restricting participation of victims to crimes contained in the
charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. In fact, for the purposes of
participating in trial proceedings, the Appeals Chamber has made it clear that the
"harm alleged by a victim and the concept of personal interests under article 68
(3)
113
of the Statute must be linked with the charges confirmed against the accused."
In the first decision concerning participatory rights, the Pre-Trial Chamber I
relying on Rule 85, established a few conditions for applicants to be granted the
status of victims in order to participate in proceedings. 14 Namely, victim
applicants have to: i) be natural persons; ii) persons who have suffered harm; iii)
the harm has to have been caused by alleged crimes covered by the ICC's15
jurisdiction; and iv) show a causal link between the alleged crimes and the harm.'
The definition of victim is the basis of any application for participatory rights
leading one to conclude that it is a general definition and not one that only applies
pursuant to article 68(3) of the Rome Statute.
A comment on the definition of "victims" is worth noting. Judge Pikis in a
Separate Opinion concluded that the reference to the term "victim" in articles

108. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on victims'
participation, 90-92, (Jan. 18, 2008), [hereinafter Decision on Victims' Participationin the Case of
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo].

109. Id. 90.
110. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1 191, Decision on the Defence and
Prosecution Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008,
29-34 (Feb. 26, 2008).
111. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Judgment on the appeals of The
Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber Is Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January
2008, Judgment (July 11, 2008.) [hereinafter Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The
Defence].
112. Decision on Victims' Participation in the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 108,
97.
113. Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence, supra note 111, at Reasons 2.
114. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and
VPRS 6, 79 (Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo].
115. Jr6me de Hemptinne and Francesco Rindi, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Allows Victims to
Participatein the Investigation Phase of Proceedings,4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 342, 345 (2006). See also,
Jouet, supra note 14, at 260.
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43(6), 68(1), (2), (4) and (5) "leave[s] the impression that they are not confined to
16
those immediately affected by pending proceedings."'
Furthermore, only individuals can be prosecuted for international crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court, 1 7 but victims may include those who are not
natural persons, such as organizations or institutions. 18 It is also noteworthy that
the Single Judge in the situation in Darfur has concluded that the definition of
victim cannot include deceased persons within the scope of natural persons. 119
2. The Notion of Personal Interest

Qualifying as a victim is not sufficient to participate in proceedings pursuant
to article 68(3).120 Given that the definition of victim does not seem to cause much
ambiguity, participants to proceedings not only have to be victims within the
above-mentioned definition pursuant to Rule 85, but must also have their "personal
interests affected."' 12' Therefore, the notion of "personal interests" becomes of
crucial relevance because it represents the conditio sine qua non for the application
of this article. Since the article is unclear as to what can affect their personal

interests, it can be argued that the proceedings in which they wish to take part
should affect their "personal interests" and not, in a broad approach, the entire
proceedings. 122 This view is consistent with the Appeals Chamber position that an
application is needed for participation in an appeal and that the Appeals Chamber
"cannot automatically be bound by the previous determination of the Pre-Trial
Chamber that it23was appropriate for the victims to participate before the court of
first instance."1
The notion of personal interests has great impact in practice since, depending
on the interpretation the Court gives to this concept, the right to participate may be
denied. Furthermore, the right is highly dependent on the proceeding the victim
may wish to participate in, since in certain proceedings, for example concerning
procedural issues, it is difficult to conceive that a victim's personal interests could
be affected. 124 The notion of personal interests has been given some attention in
116. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 13.
117. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 1.
118. RPE ICC, supra note 22, at Rule 85.
119. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-1 I 1-Corr, Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for
Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to
a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07, 36 (Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter DarfurSituation Decision].
120. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 13.
121. Id.
122. This approach is consistent with the Appeals Chamber position that an application for
participation should be filed for each stage. See Judgment on the appeal of Lubanga Dyilo, supra note
102,
38-41.
123. Id. 43.
124. E.g., Prosecution's Response to the Joint Application of Victims, supra note 15 ("[O]rdinarily
when the issue to be addressed is a narrow and procedural one, like the one relating to whether an
appeal against a decision on confirmation may be appealed under Article 82 (1) (b), it will be difficult
to sustain a position that the victims' 'personal interests' are affected."). See also Separate Opinion of
Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 1 ( "[P]articipation of victims before the Pre-Trial Chamber does not per
se confer upon them a right to take part in an appeal mounted by a party against a first-instance decision
or any aspect of it.").
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the decisions rendered by the Court. 125 Therefore, it is necessary to analyze
whether the notion has been restrictively or broadly interpreted. Since this
criterion is, as stated above, a condition to allow participation, it is important that
the decisions of the Court are consistent in the interpretation of this concept in
order to provide for certainty and clarity for future proceedings. 126
As far as the ICC's jurisprudence is concerned, it is not yet very clear whether
this notion should receive a restrictive or broad interpretation. The first decision
that dealt with article 68(3) and the notion of "personal interests" was a decision
from the Pre-Trial Chamber I in January 2006 regarding the situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. 127 In this decision, the notion of "personal
interests" was defined in general terms at the investigation stage. 128
In relation to the same question - how victims' "personal interests" must be
affected the Single Judge Decision concluded that this will be dependent "not
only upon the nature and scope of the proceeding, but also upon the personal
circumstances of the victim in question." 129 The Single Judge Decision studied
thoroughly the issue of victims' participation rights pursuant to article 68(3) and in
particular analyzed the notion of "personal interests." 130 In this regard, the
decision studied previous jurisprudence on victims' participation rights 31 and, as
stated by the Prosecution on its Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge
Decision, 132 it took a different approach in regards to the notion of "personal
interests" than that of previous decisions. In fact, the Prosecution submitted that
"the Decision involves the issue of the extent to which victims may participate
under Article 68(3); specifically, regarding the scope of victims' participation, the
decision provides for133
a definition of the personal interests of victims diverting from
the other chambers.,
In light of these considerations, it can be argued that the Single Judge
Decision is not unambiguous in relation to the scope of victims' participation. It
concluded that victims should participate in proceedings under articles 56 and 57,
albeit these provisions do not expressly provide for participation. As the
Prosecution has stated, 3 4 article 68(3) should not provide for "autonomous
135
procedural rights" as it can be argued from the Single Judge Decision.

125. See Judgment on the Appeal of Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 102, 43; Single Judge Decision,
supra note 55, at 77 9-10; Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 13.
126. Prosecution'sA pplication for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, at
Introduction.
127. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, 61.
128. Id. 63.
129. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 89.
130. Id. 7 8-10.
131. E.g. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, 7 (analyzing mainly the
Pre-trial Chamber I decision).
132. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 6.
133. Id.
134. Id. f 7.
135. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 103.
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A more recent decision has also touched on the issue of "personal interests" at
the investigation stage. Judge Kuenyehia, in the situation in Darfur has noted:
It is the view of the Single Judge that in accordance with article 68(3) of
the Statute and the jurisprudence of the Court, the assessment of the
personal interests of the victims in specific proceedings taking place
during the investigation of a situation and the pre-trial stage of a case is
only to be conducted for the determination of the specific
set of
1 36
procedural rights attached to the procedural status of victim.
By the same token, the Trial Chamber in a January 2008 decision on victims'
participation in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo has concluded that a "general
interest in the outcome of the case or in the issues or evidence the Chamber will be
considering at that stage is likely to be insufficient." 137 In contrast, a previous
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of January 2006, the first decision concerning
participatory rights, stated that "personal interests of victims are affected in general
at the investigation stage, since the participation of victims at this stage can serve
to clarify the facts, to punish
the perpetrators of crimes and to request reparations
38
for the harm suffered."'

As far as the Appeals Chamber is concerned, it has taken a decision of
principle and has concluded that decisions on whether victims' personal interests
are affected should be made on a case-by-case basis. 139 It has further urged that
extreme caution should be taken in order
to avoid confusing victims' personal
1 40
interests with the role of the Prosecution.
In light of the above decisions and taking into account the different
interpretations of judges, it is still too soon to conclude on which test should be
used in the application of article 68(3) of the Rome Statute in relation to the notion
of "personal interests." 141
3. The Appropriateness of Participation
As far as other conditions of article 68(3) are concerned, the appropriateness
of participation is an important factor to consider. Once the Court has decided that
victims' personal interests are affected by the proceedings in which they wish to
participate, their participation is again not automatic. The Court must adjudicate
on whether it is appropriate for them to participate at that particular stage of the
proceedings. 142
136. Darfur Situation Decision, supra note 119, 13.
137. Decision on Victims' Participation in the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 108,
96.
138. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, 63.
139. The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15,
28
(concluding that the question should be decided on a case-by-case basis, but noting some "clear
examples" of situations where the personal interests of victims are affected).
140. Id.
141. See Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29,
9.
142. The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15, at
Separate Opinion of Judge Song, 21.
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The question of appropriateness of participation, like that of the notion of
personal interests, is to be addressed by the victims in an application seeking leave
to participate. 143 The application should also be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Victims will not be granted an automatic right of participation just because their
personal interests are affected. This is clearly evidenced by Judge Song in his
Separate Opinion in the June 2007 Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint
Applications of Victims. 144 He concluded that although the personal interests of
victims were affected, an application for leave to appeal a decision pursuant to
article 82(1)(b) of the Rome Statute is not the appropriate stage for victims to
participate in the proceedings. At this stage of the proceedings, the Appeals
is determining a preliminary issue on whether or not the appeal can be
Chamber
145
heard.
The question of appropriateness of participation is closely related to the rights
of the accused and the right to a fair and expeditious trial. Participatory rights
should not be granted if the consequence is to cause an undue delay in the
proceedings and thus prejudice the rights of the accused. It seems that this is an
important consideration the Court will take into account when judging whether
participation is appropriate at a certain stage of the proceedings. 146 In his Separate
Opinion, Judge Song concluded that
[I]n the circumstances of the present case, it would not be appropriate

for the Victims to participate at this stage and to submit their views and
concerns in relation to the admissibility of the appeal. The proceedings
in this appeal have been delayed for several weeks due to the
withdrawal of counsel for the Appellant shortly after the appeal had
at this stage
been filed . . . On balance, the participation of the Victims
47
of the proceedings therefore would be inappropriate. 1

When judging on the appropriateness of participation, the Single Judge
Decision noted that this notion is highly connected to the effect on "personal
interests":
[T]he statute makes it clear that the Court's discretion in determining
the appropriateness of a victim's participation has to be exercised
against the criterion of the existence of an impact on the personal
interests of the applicant. With regard to each of the victims involved,
this determination will then depend not only upon the nature and scope

143. Judgment on the Appeal of Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 102, 38.
144. The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15 at
Separate Opinion of Judge Song, 21. Judge Song concluded that "In light of this decision of the
Appeals Chamber and in the circumstances of the present case, it would not be appropriate for the
Victims to participate at this stage and to submit their views and concerns in relation to the admissibility
of the appeal." Id. 23.
145. Id. at Decision, 26.
146. Id. at Decision, 22.
147. Id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Song, 23.
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of the proceeding, but also upon the personal circumstances of the
48
victim in question.
In light of the above, whenever the rights of the accused, which are defined in
article 67 of the Rome Statute, 149 and the right to a fair and expeditious trial, are in
jeopardy, participation will consequently be inappropriate. As noted by Judge
Pikis in his Separate Opinion,150 the appropriateness of the participation will
depend on the manner in which victims' views and concerns are expressed. To
decide on the appropriate stage of the proceedings it is important to analyze in
what way the participation is to occur. In the words of Judge Pikis, participation at
a stage of the proceedings
[M]ust be at an interval of the proceedings that would be appropriate,
regard being had to the norms of a fair and impartial trial and the rights
of the accused evaluated within the context of the Statute. An opportune
stage at which the views and concerns of participating victims may be
presented is at the outset of the proceedings, alerting the Court and the
parties to the implications of the case on the personal interests of
15
victims and how best they may be safeguarded. '
It goes without saying that the "presentation of views and concerns" should be
152
in accordance with the rights of the accused, as the text of article 68(3) states.
However, in practice how should this participation be exercised? It is a concern to
the accused as well as to the Prosecution that the victims are not given a very broad
right of participation so as to become a second prosecutor. 53 Reconciling the broad
right of participation which article 68(3) creates and the right of the accused to
have only one opponent is a difficult task; therefore, it is crucial to limit the scope
of the participation to strictly the presentation of "views and concerns" of the
victims and to properly define what this mode of participation consists of.
In this sense, the Prosecutor bears some duties in regards to the accused that
54
the victims do not have. For instance, the Prosecution holds the burden of proof.
If participatory rights are unlimited, it may well happen that victims perform duties
that are solely incumbent upon the Prosecution and thus affect the notion of
"equality of arms." 155 For the equilibrium of the process not to be broken, victims
should not concur with the Prosecution in the effort to prove the accused's guilt
and get a conviction. Their role should be to provide the Court, the Prosecution,

148. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 7 89.
149. Rome Statute, supra note 1,at art. 67.
150. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 17.
151. Id.
720.
152. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 236.
153. See, e.g., Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note
29, 7 13, (citing Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-901-Corr-tEN, Corrigendum to the
Response to the Application by Victims a/000 1/06,a/0002/06,a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 for
Authorization to Participate in the Appeal Proceedings Relating to the Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 77 25, 29-31 (May 16, 2007)).
154. Rome Statute, supra note 1,art. 66, para. 2.
155. See, e.g., Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26.
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and the accused with their concerns. In practice, victims should not be allowed to
interfere in any role that by its nature belongs solely to the Prosecution in
accordance with its duties pertaining to evidence and conviction. Judge Pikis in
his Separate Opinion drew a good illustration of how the equilibrium may be
reached in practice. Victims ought not to have the power to make any accusation,
nor to present their views and concerns in relation to the evidence, the conduction
56
of the case by the Prosecution or the defence put together by the accused.1
The purpose of victims' participation is to shed light on the suffering and
harm that occurred during or as a consequence of the crime being considered and
assist in the discovery of the truth. Furthermore, their views and concerns can
bring a voice to the entire community who suffered, if not as direct victims,
certainly as indirect victims of the crimes committed. If this is the manner in
which participation occurs, it does not conflict with the roles of other parties and
may indeed prove beneficial for the conduct of proceedings, since it puts the
crimes in perspective by giving an idea of the reality in times of conflict. In this
sense, victims' participation can be beneficial to the establishment of the truth
since they have "first-hand knowledge of the crimes."'157 Furthermore, their
participation as victims and not merely their testimony as witnesses can assist the
Court with clarification of the facts of the case. As noted by Claude Jorda and
Jr6me de Hemptinne,
this role can be a "decisive contribution to the prevention of
' 58
future crimes.'

4. The Rights of the Accused and the Notion of a Fair and Impartial Trial
Further conditions imposed by article 68(3), are that participation be done in
accordance with the rights of the accused and with a fair and impartial trial. This
paper has already discussed these conditions when analyzing the notions of
"personal interest" and the "appropriate stage of the proceedings." It is evident
from these discussions that it is difficult to untangle them from the other conditions
stipulated in article 68(3). Nonetheless, it is still important to give some
supplementary attention to these two conditions (the rights of the accused and the
notion of fair and impartial trial) which are inseparable.
The rights of the accused are expressly defined in article 67 of the Rome
Statute. 159 However, this list is not exhaustive. Other rights can be found
throughout various provisions of the Rome Statute. For instance, article 66 enacts
the principle of presumption of innocence well-recognized in international criminal
law and in many domestic criminal systems.' 60 In practical terms, the inclusion of

156. Id. 15-16 (Judge Pikis draws an analysis of the terms "views and concerns," and in regards to
other versions of the Rome Statute he concludes that "[t]he term 'views' in the context of article 68 (3)
of the Statute signifies 'opinion', in fact an opinion, stance or position on a subject. In the Russian and
Spanish version of article 68 (3) of the Statute the word 'opinion' is used. '[C]oncems' signify matters of
interest to a person; matters that preoccupy him/her. '[P]r~occupations' is precisely the word used in the
French text of the Statute.").
157. Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1397.

158. Id.
159. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67.
160. Id. at art. 66. The author submits that this principle could also be regarded as a component of

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:3

the victims in the proceedings cannot in any way interfere with the defendant's
presumption of innocence as victims' participation give a different color to the
facts which are being presented to the Court. In addition to the rights provided for
in the Rome Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide for some basic
guarantees to the accused. 16 1 Further to the presumption of innocence, there are
other guarantees to ensure that the accused receive a just and impartial
judgment. 162

The condition of a fair and impartial trial is a right of the defendant. This
notion is particularly linked with an expeditious trial, on which victims'
participation can cause a great impact. Participatory rights can be a real threat to
the expeditiousness of the trial since in certain cases the number of victims can be
very high and thus cause undue delays to the proceedings. 63 It is thus crucial to
define who is eligible to participate and when it is appropriate to participate. It is
always important to keep in mind that the positions of victims and that of the
accused can be opposed throughout the proceedings. 164 Therefore the views and
concerns of victims cannot affect the rights of the accused or the right to a fair and
impartial trial.
The right to a "fair and impartial trial," as stated in the Single Judge Decision,
includes the notion that the fairness of the proceedings "should be preserved to the
benefit of all participants in the proceedings," and that would include victims and
Prosecution, as well as the accused who is the core beneficiary of this right.165 It
goes without saying that the participation at a certain stage may jeopardize the
rights of the accused whereas in other stages it might not.
However broad the participatory rights granted in article 68(3) may be,1 66 the
accused is also granted many rights and guarantees. The aim is then to balance
those rights. From the decisions of the ICC interpreting participatory rights in light
of the rights of the accused, this balance is being sought.
The Court should not be carried away with the undeniable need for
participatory rights and all arguments in favor of broad participation, if that is to
the detriment of the rights of the accused. To reach the "balance of conflicting
interests", victim's rights should be limited at certain stages of the proceedings
where their participation could put at risk the accused's rights. These stages where
participation may infringe the accused's rights are, for example, stages where the
the right to a fair and impartial trial.
161. See, e.g., RPE ICC, supra note 22, at rule 141(2) (allowing the accused to have the last word
at the end of the trial). This right is particularly important since victims can have the right to express
the effect of the evidence on their personal interests at the end of the trial, as noted by Judge Pikis,
Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 21.
162. E.g. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 63 (stating that trial should be in the presence of the
accused).
163. See Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1408.
164. Jouet, supra note 14, at 250.
165. Decision on Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 92, T 27.
166. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68, para. 3. Other more specific rights are granted to
victims in article 15(3), 19 and others. However, article 68(3) enacts a very broad right of participation
in the sense that it refers to participation in proceedings, which has a very broad definition.
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question is purely procedural1 67 or stages where their participation might interfere
the Prosecution with regard to the case, e.g. in
with the duties that belong solely to 68
instances of evidence management. 1
B. The Scope ofParticipatoryRights Pursuantto Section 68(3) of the Rome
Statute
This section will briefly analyze the scope of participation in the proceedings.
First, it will examine participation in a case as opposed to a situation. Second, it
will analyze the mode of participation, such as the presentation of "views and
concerns" pursuant to article 68(3) of the Rome Statue and other types of
participation. The analysis in this part of the essay will be fairly short as the
question of the scope of participation has been touched upon to a certain extent
previously in this paper.
On a preliminary note, in terms of the manner in which participation may
occur, it is important to first examine the general form of participation established
in article 68(3) which applies to participation pursuant to other articles of the
Rome Statute, such as articles 56 and 57 of the Rome Statute, as has been
discussed. 169 The manner in which participation may occur has an impact in
practice depending on whether this participation occurs by presenting their views
to the Court, 171 or
and concerns 170 or whether it is by "submit[ting] observations
1' 72
even by "mak[ing] representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber."
The text of article 68(3) does not specifically provide an explanation of
whether it refers to victims of a situation or victims of a case. 173 Since this
provision concerns participation at stages of the "proceedings," it serves as a
general provision for participation at different phases, as stated above. This was
the interpretation adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the ICC's first decision
concerning victims' participation.1 74 This decision makes it clear that the wording
167. Prosecution's Response to the Joint Application of Victims, supra note 15, 3.
168. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 12.
169. See discusion supra Part III.
170. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68, para. 3.
171. See id. at art. 19, para. 3.
172. See id. at art. 15, para. 3.
173. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 221-22. The author affirms that "the Statute and Rules fail to
specify clearly if and where participatory rights are linked to 'victims of a situation' (e.g. all natural
persons, organizations and institutions that have suffered harm as a result of the commission of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court in a specific territory) or confined to 'victims of a case' (e.g. natural
persons, organizations and institutions that have suffered harm as a result of the conduct of one or
several identified accused or suspects)." Furthermore, he suggests two possible interpretations for the
notion of victims: "broad approach ... in relation to the territorial and temporal scope of the 'situation'.
This position receives some support from the broad definition of victims under Rule 85 and the fact that
the protection of the interests of victims is a principle which applies, in general, at all stages of the
proceedings .... Moreover, the concept of 'victims of the situation' is expressly embedded in specific
provisions of the ICC system."
72-75 (recognizing
174. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, at
victims' participatory rights at the investigation stage, in the context of a situation, and concluding that
participation pursuant to article 68(3) could entitle victims with a right to take part in proceedings
relating to articles 56 and 57 of the Rome Statute).
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of article 68(3) of the Rome Statute was interpreted broadly enough to allow for (i)
participation in the investigation stage of proceedings 175 and (ii) allow for
participation in the investigation of a situation.176 This position has been
questioned by the Prosecution; 177 however the Pre-Trial Chamber I denied the
Prosecution's application for leave to appeal this decision. 78 Moreover, this
interpretation was reaffirmed by the Single Judge Decision. 179 A decision in the
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has confirmed that participation in
the investigation stage is permitted pursuant to article 68(3) and that it is possible
to be granted
the status of victim to participate in proceedings before the Pre-Trial
80
Chambers. 1
As far as the mode of participation is concerned, Judge Pikis in his Separate
Opinion presents an interesting approach.1 81 He proceeds to an interpretation of
the terms "views and concerns." He concludes that this mode of participation is a
very strict one and does not provide victims with a right to become a party to the
proceedings. 182 Furthermore, he pursues an analysis on the significance of the
term "views" and concludes that victims' views are their opinions, their position in
relation to a subject and their "concerns" means their preoccupations, something
83
that bothers them.1
Finally, it is worth noting that once all the conditions of article 68(3) are met,
the Court has to permit victims' views and concerns to be presented, since the text
of the article uses84the word "shall" and not "may" as it was a matter of discussion
and negotiation.1

175. Id. 72. For an analysis of participation at the investigation stage, see David Lounici &
Damien Scalia, Premidre D~cision de la Cour P~nale InternationaleRelative aux Victimes: Etat des
Lieux et Interrogations,76 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNALE 375 (2005).

176. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, at
65-66.
177. Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-85, Prosecution's Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications
for Participation of Applicants a/0010/06, a10064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and
a/01 11/06 to a/0127/06 in the Uganda Situation,
20-21 (Feb. 28, 2007). The Prosecution is of the
view that the text of article 68(3) is not broad enough to include participation in the investigation of a
situation.
178. Situation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo, ICC-01/04-135, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber's Decision of 17 January 2006 on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and
VPRS 6 (March 31, 2006).
179. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, at
88-90.
180. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-423, Corrigendum to the
Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/00 16/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to
a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 to a/0110/06, a/0188/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06,
a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06 to a/0230/06, a/0234/06 to
a/0236/06, a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to a/0239/06 and
a/0241/06 to a/0250/06, Introduction (Jan. 31, 2008).
181. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 14-17.
182. Id. 15.
183. Id.
184. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Committee of the Whole, Working Group on Procedural Matters, Rome,
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V. CONCLUSION

Hideous crimes are a major concern for the entire international community.
The need to prevent these crimes from happening as well as to punish the criminals
is the endeavor of international criminal justice. However, a justice system cannot
be complete without taking into account the existence of victims of crimes and
what they have to say about the violence they have experienced during conflict
situations.
Hearing the victims' voice' 85 is the beginning of a process of reconstructing
societies destroyed by international crimes and providing for their reintegration.
With the establishment of the ICC as a permanent court to try the gravest crimes,
victims' rights are now rooted in its legal documents. This represents a historic
event. This paper has addressed whether participatory rights pits victims' against
the accused by compromising the latter's rights. This paper has argued that
victims' participatory rights do not necessarily have to conflict with the rights of
the accused and a fair and expeditious trial.
The ICC system can become a system of justice186 that moves away from
times when suffering was regarded as a tool for punishing criminals to a system
where pain brings the right to participation and restoration. The threat of turning
victims into a second prosecutor against the accused does not have to become real.
This article has argued that the equilibrium can be reached in practice if victims are
not granted participation rights at stages when their participation is not appropriate
(e.g. at the investigation phase) and are granted limited rights at early stages of the
proceedings (thus avoiding undue delays in the proceedings).
Much depends on the current development of the jurisprudence of the ICC in
the interpretation and application of these provisions. The manner in which judges
of the Court will interpret and apply these provisions is under current development.
Competing rights need not necessarily be opposed and it is for the Court to provide
for harmony amongst opposing interests. It remains to be seen whether the
provisions concerning participatory rights will amount to a "charter of victims'
rights", that also takes into consideration opposing rights and interests.

Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, ProposalSubmitted by Canada, 3, A/CONF.183/C.I/WGPM!L.58 (July
6, 1998) (showing that both terms were suggested for article 68(3) of the Rome Statute).
185. As suggested by the authors Mekjian & Varughese in the title of their article, "Hearing the
Victim's Voice: Analysis of Victims' Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International
Criminal Court", supra note 4.
186. But see Donat-Cattin, supra note 10 (stating that the right to participate in proceedings is a
true "justice for victims"). The author disagrees with the idea of "justice for victims," since justice is a
notion that can only be achieved by the considerations of all parties involved, the community as a
whole.

